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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

LIMITED GOVERNMENT AND THE WELFARE CLAUSE
By
HON. JOSEPH L. CALL*

The construction of the U. S. Constitution has at all times, since the genesis
of the Republic, been represented by two opposing fields of thought. Jefferson,
an individualist, an advocate of states' rights, a disciple of John Locke' and
an avowed opponent of centralization of governmental power advocated at
all times a rigid construction. On the other hand, Hamilton, a vigorous advocate of strong centralized government, advocated consequently a loose construction and construction by interpolation. Each had his own adherents and followers, but so profund were the differences on this basic premise that there resulted,
as the aftermath of this struggle, two parties-the Jeffersonian or the Democratic-Republican Party, and the Federalist Party.
Briefly stated, the judicial philosophy of nationalism or strong centralized
government came to the front. In 1803, acting under the authority given it in
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Federal Constitution, in the case of Marbury
v. Madison2 the principle of judicial review was established, thus placing the
court "over the Constitution." 3
The doctrine was extended in Martin v. Hunters Lessee4 in which the court
held that final decisions of the state supreme courts on federal questions were
subject to review by the United States Supreme Court.
In McCulloch v. Maryland5 in a decision of monumental importance, the
court read into the constitution the doctrine of implied powers, and the continued
adoption of this judicial synthesis in Gibbons v. Ogden6 so transcended the commerce clause as to open the door to construction which now encompasses the entire
7
agricultural and industrial life of the states.
Coming now to the controversial "General Welfare Clause," we note that
it is to be found as a part of Article I, Section 8, Subdivision I of the United
States Constitution, which reads as follows:
* Judge, Municipal Court Los Angeles Judicial District, Presiding Judge, 1945.

1 The Declaration of Independence was mostly the work of Thomas Jefferson, although Adams
and Franklin suggested minor alterations. The salient features were borrowed from the philosophy and theory of government as expressed in John Locke's second treatise: JOHN LOCKE, Two
TREATISES

ON

GOVERNMENT

(1694).

2 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
8 EDWIN S. CORWIN,

COURT OVER CONSTITUTION

(1938).

4 1 Wheat. 304 (1816).

5 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
6 9 Wheat. 31 (1824).
7 Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Mulford v. Smith, 309 U.S. 38 (1939); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
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"SECTION 8. The Congress shall have the power 1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for
the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all

duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States." (Emphasis added.)
This clause has agitated and proved to be one of the most provocative clauses
of our Constitution, its proper interpretation being one of the basic issues between
Jefferson and Madison and the Democratic-Republican Party and Hamilton and
the Federalist Party, the crucial point again striking at the fundamental premise
of limited government through the question of "loose" or "strict" construction
of the Constitution. These two constructions may be stated as follows:
(1) The Jefferson or Madison interpretation, which was that the power
"to lay and collect taxes . . ., to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; . . ." must be confined as de-

scriptive of and limited by the succeeding specific enumeration of powers
to be found in the succeeding subdivisions of Section 8.
(2) The construction of Mr. Justice Story, which is that from the terms
of the grant (supra), Congress has a substantive power to tax and appropriate,
limited only by the requirements that it shall be exercised to provide for the
common defense and general welfare of the United States, and is not confined
to, or limited by the subsequently enumerated specific grants of power to Congress.
Throughout the years, however, the "General Welfare Clause" has withstood
the challenge of judicial interpretation, or at least has not been the subject of
judicial consideration. However, in 1936 in the case of United States v. Butler,8
the court did announce its conclusions on this clause. To say that the holding of
the Supreme ,Court approving the interpretation of Mr. Justice Story has "softened
by a quasi" 9 the doctrines of limited government is to temper the seriousness of
the court challenge with restraint.
In analyzing the question as to which construction is correct, it is necessary
to inquire into the circumstances surrounding its adoption, the opinions of those
who participated in its early analysis, consideration and debate, and also the
opinions of contemporaries who later discussed constructions of the clause. 10
In the course of its proceedings the Federal Convention adopted on August
16, after recommendation of the Committee of Detail, the following clause:
8 297 U.S. 1 (1936). The Supreme Court in this case states (p. 66) that Mr. Justice Story
in his commentaries espouses the Hamiltonian position. However, an analysis of the conclusions
of Story and Hamilton would indicate that Hamilton advocated a much looser construction than
did Mr. Justice Story.
9 The expression of Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
10 In this connection the discussion of the background at the Federal Constitution by James
Madison in a letter to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 1830) is most instructive and enlightening. See
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, Vol. LV, p. 122 (1865),
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"The legislature of the United States shall have the power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises.""
However, after this adoption by the Convention great solicitation and debate developed in the Convention about the power of Congress to pay (a) the
debts of the Revolutionary War, and (b) the necessity and propriety of the United
States assuming and paying all of the debts of the states. In connection with the
payment of the debts of the states it was forcibly argued in the Convention that
inasmuch as Congress was to appropriate the taxes on imports, and inasmuch as
that was one of the chief sources of income to the states, the Federal Congress
should thereupon assume payment of the state obligations. Consequently two
motions were made (1) that Congress have the power "to secure the payment
of the public debt"' 2 and (2) that a special committee be appointed, one member
from each state to "consider the necessity and expediency of the United States
assuming all the state debts. '' i
Obviously, it was contended in the Convention that there was no obligation
on the Federal Government to pay the debts of the states and it was debatable
whether or not under the taxing power as proposed, there was a right of the
Federal Government to pay the debts of the Confederation heretofore incurred.
On August 19 the special committee was appointed, and on August 21 the
committee recommended to the Federal Convention the adoption of the following power:
"The legislature of the United States shall have power to fulfill
the engagements which have been entered into by Congress, and to discharge as well the debts of the United States as the debts incurred by the
several states during the late war, for the common defense and the general welfare." 14 (Emphasis added).
Thus it is to be seen that there is proposed for ratification to the Federal
Convention power of Congress to:
(1) Fulfill the engagements which have been entered into by
Congress;
(2) To discharge as well the debts of the U. S.;
(3) To discharge the debts incurred by the several states during
the late war;
(4) Said debts incurred for the common defense and general
welfare.
It is therefore apparent that the phrase "for the common defense and general welfare" appears at this point for the first time before the Convention
and had definite and sole reference to the payment of the obligations of the
Confederacy heretofore incurred during the Revolutionary War, and the obliga11 MAX FARRAND,

inafter cited as
12 II FARRAND
18 II FARRAND
14 II FARRAND

THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, Vol.

FARRAND).
325, 326.
327.
352.

I, p. 308

(1911)

(here-

200
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tions of the states incurred for the common defense and general welfare during
the late war.
The debates in the Convention thereafter reflect that the members were
concerned that Congress might still repudiate the old debts by failure to pay the
same and consequently the following substitute motion was made and carried
in lieu of the recommendation of the special committee:
"The legislature shall discharge the debts and fulfill the engagements of the United States.' (Emphasis added).
Upon adoption of this motion the Convention thereafter, on August 23,
placed this new clause prior to the taxing power adopted on August 16 and so
adopted the following:
"The legislature shall fulfill the engagements and discharge the
debts of the United States and shall 1have
the power to lay and collect
5
taxes, duties, imposts and excises."
The records of the Convention show that thereafter debate still continued
and was critical relative to the mandatory use of the word "shall," it being strenuously contended that compulsory obligation on Congress to pay all of the old
debts of the Confederacy would result in the unjust enrichment of those who
had purchased bonds and obligations at a few cents on the dollar. And, consequently on motion given, made and carried the word "shall" was stricken and
the clause was this time adopted as follows:
"All debts contracted and engagements entered into, by or under
the authority of Congress shall be valid against the United States under
this Constitution as under the confederation."' 6
Thus the payment of the debts of the confederation was left under the discretion of Congress.
It can here be noticed that the report of the special committee under date
of August 21, recommending in part the payment of the debts incurred by the
several states during the late war for the common defense and general welfare,
was entirely superseded by the substitute motion made and adopted on August
22 which eliminated any reference to state debts. Inasmuch as this question of
the payment of the state debts had been eliminated in the subsequent motion
adopted by the Federal Convention, the matter still evolved discussion of the
delegates and precipitated the reference of the question of state debts again on
August 31 to a committee of eleven. On September 4 the committee returned
its findings to the Federal Convention. However, the question of the affirmance and payment of the state debts for which the committee was created was
still ignored and, instead, the committee being of the opinion that an express
power was necessary to enable Congress to pay the old debts, it moved that the
taxing provision heretofore formally adopted be amended so as to provide as
follows:
15 II FARRAND 328; also, WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, Vol. LV, p. 124.
16 II FARRAND 414.
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"The legislature shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide17for the common defense and general welfare of the United States."
This new proposal by the committee of eleven was then unanimously approved
by the Federal Convention and embodies the taxing power as it is presently
provided for in the United States Constitution.
In discussing, therefore, the perturbant clause "and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States" it is necessary to remember at all times that the clause was first submitted by the special committee
on August 21 as a clause of limitation, i.e., that Congress was to (a) discharge
the debts of the United States and (b) the debts incurred by the several states
during the late war, "for the common defense and general welfare." It can be
therefore concluded that the clause originally saw its initiation into the Constitution as descriptive of Revolutionary War debts to be paid. It is the contention of this writer that the correct constructions are the conclusions reached
by Jefferson and Madison that the phrase is a limitation of the right to tax
and spend but the general purposes themselves, i.e., to pr6vide for the common defense and the general welfare were limited and explained by the subsequent enumerated powers. In other words, Congress has a power to tax . . . .
and spend and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States but as is specified in the enumerated powers thereinafter set forth
and fixed in Congress.
In drawing further conclusions on the correct construction of this clause,
the principles, restatements and conclusions of Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton
and Story are of great value.
I Jefferson's Contention
Undoubtedly it is correct to say that Jefferson was the most conspicuous
apostle of democracy in America and most antiphonal in his constitutional belief. His original contention on the construction of this clause appears in 1791
in his communication to President Washington on the question of the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States. Discussing the welfare clause in
this communication he advised President Washington that the clause "to pay
the debts and provide for the welfare of the Union" was descriptive of the
power to tax and was not to be construed as giving a distinct and independent
power to do any act which Congress might think would be for the good of
the Union. He further stated that otherwise construed "it would reduce the
whole instrument to a single phrase, that of instituting a Congress with powers
to do whatever would be for the good of the United States; and as they would
be the sole judges of the good or evil it would also be a power to do whatever
17 II FARRAND 497.
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evil they pleased." It was his conclusion to Washington that "it was intended
to lace them up strictly within the enumerated powers . . . ... 18
He adhered to the same conclusions again in 1792. In later years his conclusions were in no wise changed. In a communication to Spencor Roane in
1815 he discusses the dangers of powers by implication, and in discussing the
clause "common defense and general welfare" he again concludes that it was
absurd to reason that the Convention would delegate specified powers to Congress and at the same time specify unlimited powers. He states this proposition
as follows:
... .they could not be awkward in language as to mean, as we
say, 'all and some'. And should this construction prevail, all limits to
the Federal Government are done away with. This opinion, formed on
the first use of the question, I have never seen any reason to change,
whether in or out of power; but on the contrary, find it strengthened
and confirmed by five and twenty years of additional reflection and
experience ....

'20

And what appears to be the last public utterance upon the subject is contained
in a letter to Albert Gallatin in 1817, in which arguing the question of the
veto by President Madison of an act of Congress providing for internal improvements, Jefferson after concluding that the act was not within the expressed powers of Congress, and discussing this tenet as the division line between the Democratic Republicans and the Federalists, concludes as follows:
".... Congress had not unlimited powers to provide for the general welfare, but were restrained to those specifically enumerated; and
that as it was never mean they should provide for that welfare but
by the exercise of the enumerated powers, so it could not have been
meant they should raise money for purposes which the enumeration did
not place under their action; consequently the specification of powers
is a imitation of the purposes for which they may raise money .... .21
II Madison's Contention

Probably only second to Jefferson was James Madison in his advocacy of
the constitutional doctrines of strict construction and the original doctrines of
the Democratic-Republican Party. In analyzing his views on the Welfare Clause,
it must be borne in mind that Madison took a leading part in the debates of
the Convention and was scholarly in his keeping full, careful and complete
notes,22 and the records of the Convention show that he spoke more frequently
than any other delegate, with the exception of James Wilson and Grovenor
Morris, and an analysis of his debates with the ultimate draft of the Constitution show that his influence and conclusions largely shaped the final document.
Vol. V, p. 286 (Ford edition).
Vol. VI, p. 141 (Ford edition).
14, 350 (Library edition).
21 WORKS, Vol. X, 91 (Ford edition).
22 These notes were published by order of Congress. Three volumes-Washington-1843.
18

WRITING,
19 WRITING,
20 WRITINGS,

1956
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He strenuously and continuously contended that the Constitution should not be
interpreted by interpolation and thusly be made the means of introducing radical innovations.
Madison on at least five public occasions expressed his views on the Welfare Clause, his last expression being in 1830 in his letter to Andrew Stevenson.2 3 In all of his expositions his conclusions were basically the same but possibly more pronounced with the passing of time. In the Federalist, 24 in contending for the ratification of the Constitution against the attacks being based
by its opponents on the power to lay and collect taxes, and in defense of the
proposition that the Welfare Clause contains a delegation of unlimited powers
to Congress, he stated as follows:
"But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the
objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows and is
not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? . ... for
what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted
if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? .... ."
In 1791 while a member of the House of Representatives, and in debating
the question of the establishment of the Bank of the United States, he advises
the House that an interpretation that destroys the very characteristics of government cannot be just, and if it were, such a power could only be deducted from
the power to lay and collect taxes and provide for the common defense and
general welfare, and concludes in part:
the power as to these general purposes (common defense
and general welfare) was limited to acts laying taxes for them; and the
general purposes themselves were limited and explained by the particular enumeration subjoined. To understand these terms in any sense,
that would justify the power in question, would give to Congress an
unlimited power; . . . . would supersede all the powers reserved to
the state governments. .... 21
His same conclusions were again reaffirmed in 1817, this time as President of the United States in a message to the Congress vetoing a bill for certain internal improvements. However, in this veto message he raises for the
first time the most significant question and conclusion, which is that to permit Congress to have an unlimited power to tax "for the common defense
and general welfare" would be to nullify the doctrine of judicial review of
the acts of Congress on constitutional grounds because as he states:
"... such a view . . . .would have the effect of excluding the
judicial authority of the United States from its participation in guarding the boundary between the legislative powers of the general and
the state governments, inasmuch as questions relating to the general
Id. at 121.
24 No. XLI (1788).
25 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, at 1946, 1st Congress, 2d Session (1791).
23
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welfare being questions of policy and
expedience, are unsusceptible of
26
judicial cognizance and decision."
And, in 1830 in his letter to Stevenson, 27 in a complete summation of all
of his prior utterances, and in answer to the contention of the proponents of
unlimited power as to why the terms "common defense and general welfare"
if not meant to convey the comprehensive power which, taken literally, they
express, were not qualified and explained by some reference to the particular
powers subjoined, queries, that if the terms were meant to embrace not only
all the powers particularly expressed, but also the indefinite power which has
been claimed under them, why was not such intention so declared and why
was so much critical labor employed in enumerating the particular powers if
the general clause was to be all comprehensive?
It is incomprehensible, he argues, to believe that delegates to the Federal
Convention there for the purpose of protecting the sovereignty of the states
and creating a general government of limited powers would intentionally place
in the Federal Constitution a phrase susceptible of being omnipotent in its
grant of power and creating a nullity of the specified delegation of powers.
He describes his intention thusly:
it exceeds the possibility of belief, that the known advo1.....
cates in the Convention for a jealous grant and cautious definition of
federal powers should have silently permitted the introduction of
words or phrases in a sense rendering fruitless the restrictions and definitions elaborated by them."
And, thereafter in pointing out that such a construction would in effect
create two separate constitutions, he concludes:
"Consider for a moment the inmeasurable difference between the
Constitution limited in its powers to the enumerated objects, and expounded as it would be by the import claimed for the phraseology in
question. The difference is equivalent to two constitutions, of characters
essentially contrasted with each other-the one possessing powers confined to certain specified cases, the other extending to all cases whatsoever; for what is the case that would not be embraced by a general
power to raise money, of power to provide for the general welfare,
and a power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry these powers
into execution; all such provisions and laws superseding, at the same
time, all local laws and constitutions at variance with them? Can less
be said with the evidence before us, furnished by the journal of the
Convention itself, that that is impossible that such a constitution as the
latter would have been recommended to the states by all the members
of that body whose names were suscribed to the instrument.''28
26 ME SSAGES AND PAPERS OF TjiE PRESIDENTS (Richardson),

National Literature, New York (1917).

Vol. II, p. 569, Public Bureau of

27 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, op. cit. supra note 26, Vol. LV, p. 121.
28 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, op. cit. supra note 26, at 28.
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III Hamilton's Contention

Hamilton's writings in advocacy of loose construction of the Constitution
have always been strikingly imperialistic in basis, and he never ceased to avow
on all occasions his aristocratic-monarchistic partialities. Initially it was he and
James Wilson 29 who so vehemently and strenuously attacked the adoption of
the Federal Bill of Rights as a false philosophy, unnecessary and improper and
detrimental to the people's rights. From these principles his writings all reason
deductively and his philosophy of government would not see or would not conceive the righteousness of or propriety of the two great conquests of the colonial
period-local self-government and the doctrine of sovereignty in the people.
In construction of the Welfare Clause he was ardent in his contention that
the power of Congress to lay and collect taxes "for the common defense and
general welfare" was plenary and indefinite and fully comprehended the payment of the public debts and providing for the common defense and general
welfare. He felt that the power to appropriate its revenues should not be restricted by the subsequent enumeration of powers subjoined to the clause, and
that the "general welfare" should be the guiding hand in the ultimate right
of Congress to tax and appropriate. With the exception that there should be
an apportionment for direct taxes, uniformity for indirect taxes and prohibition
of taxes on exports, his contention is stated as follows:
"The power to raise money is plenary and indefinite, and the objects to which it may be appropriated are no less comprehensive than
the payment of the public debts, and the providing or the common
defense and general welfare. The terms 'general welfare' were doubtless intended to signify more than was expressed or imported in those
which preceded; otherwise, numerous exigencies incident to the affairs
of a nation would have been left without a provision. The phrase is as
comprehensive as any that could have been used, because it was not fit
that the constitutional authority of the Union to appropriate its revenues should have been restricted within narrower limits than the 'general welfare,' and because this necessarily embraces a vast variety of
particulars which are susceptible neither of specification nor of definition."
The objects which concerned the "general welfare" and for which under
that description an appropriation of money is requisite and proper should be
"left to the discretion of the national legislature." His conclusions were so broad
that he felt that appropriations for money under this clause could be made
(with the exceptions heretofore stated) without restriction as long as they
were general objects and not local objects, concluding in this respect as follows:
".....
the object to which an appropriation of money is to be made
be general, and not local; its operation extending in fact or by possibility
throughout the Union, and not being confined to a particular spot."3 0
29 ELLIOTr's DEBATES ON THE CONSTITUTION, Vol. II, p. 434.

80 WORKS, Vol. III, p. 371 (Lodge edition).
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IV Story's Contention
Story while a Democratic Republican by party affiliation labored throughout his life in all of his undertakings for a centralized government and for
the absorption and vitiation of the powers of the states. In 1816 in a memorandum of notes made for delivery of a speech to be made by a friend in
Congress, he said:

". • . . I hold it to be a maxim .

. .

. that the govern-

ment of the United States is intrinsically too weak, and the powers of the state
governments too strong; that the danger always is much greater of anarchy
in the parts than of tyranny in the head." 31 To perpetuate these ends he advocated the constitutional doctrines of liberal construction, implied powers, and
the general welfare which predominate his judicial decisions and his legal commentaries. While the leading place in this work on the bench belonged to his
colleague, John Marshall, Story had a very large share in that remarkable series of decisions and opinions dating from 1816 to 1830.
In construing the power "to pay the debts and provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States," Story concedes that the
Constitution was to frame a national government of special and enumerated
powers and not of general and unlimited powers.3 2 He states that if this clause
is construed to be an independent and substitutive grant of power, it not only
renders wholly unimportant and unnecessary the subsequent enumeration of specific powers, but it plainly extends far beyond them and creates a general
authority in Congress to pass all laws which they may deem for the common
defense or general welfare. And,

consequently, he stresses the Constitution

would practically create an unlimited national government.
His construction, however, is that this clause should be construed with
and as a part of the preceding clause giving the power to lay taxes. In this respect it becomes "sensibly and operative." It becomes "a qualification" of that
clause and limits the taxing power to objects for the common defense or general welfare. It then contains "no grant of any power whatsoever; but it is a
mere expression of the ends and purposes to be effected by the preceding power
of taxation. ' '3 3 In other words, it is Story's construction that the power "to
lay and collect taxes .

. .

. to pay the debts and provide for the common de-

fense and general welfare of the United States" is without limitation as long
as the power to tax is limited to objects for the common defense or general
welfare. It is his contention that if so construed it then contains no grant of
any power.
In discussing the question as to whether this clause should be treated as a
prelude to the succeeding specifically enumerated powers, Story states:
but there is a fundamental objection to the interpretation
thus attempted to be maintained, which is, that it robs the clause of all
31

W. W. STORY, LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, Vol. I, p. 295 (1851).
32 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, Vol. 1, § 909 (1891).
38 STORY, op. cit. rupra note 32, § 911.
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efficacy and meanin%. No person has a right to assume that any part
of the Constitution is useless, or is without a meaning; and a fortiori
no person has a right to rob any part of a meaning, natural and appropriate to the language in the connection in which it stands. Now,
the words have such a natural and appropriate meaning as a qualification of the preceding clause to lay taxes. Why then should such a
meaning to be rejected?"84
And furthEr on he contends "the power then is under such circumstances,
necessarily a qualified power. If it is so, how then does it affect or in the
slightest degree trench upon the other enumerated powers?" 8 5
The Attack On Limited Government
In analyzing the judicial inroads into constitutional government that are
and have taken place, it must be borne in mind at all times that the government of the United States is based upon the fundamental precepts that all sovereignty resides in the people, and that the Federal Government was conceived
and exists only by reason of a limited delegation of powers,8 6 and that the
power to create necessarily involves the power to retract. Unfortunately, this
cardinal tenet which should serve as a beacon light to all guardians of constitutional government is often in texts upon the subject, public discussions and
judicial decisions, glossed over, or laid to one side in the interests of expediency, emergency or public clamor.3 7 To these advocates all is fusion and "with
every breath of the American people, there is born a new constitution."
In the Butler case, the court after most painstakingly stating the elementary
premise of American constitutional government that the Federal Government
is a government of limited and delegated powers and has only such powers
as are expressly conferred upon it and as may reasonably be implied from those
granted,3 8 thereafter proceeds after a brief discussion8 9 to adopt what it terms
the construction of Mr. Justice Story, concluding that "it results that the pow34 STORY, op. cit. supra note 32, § 912.
35 STORY, op. cit. supra note 32, § 922.
36 Joseph L. Call, Statement to Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States

Senate, holding hearings on proposed S.J. Resolution 1 proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the legal effect of treaties and other international agreements; United States Government Printing Office, Washington, (1955), p. 406. This statement
contains a brief but comprehensive analysis of these principles.
37 In United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947),
the Supreme Court quieted title of the
United States against the State of California in fee simple for possession of all rights and
powers over the lands and minerals and other things of value underlying the Pacific Ocean and
lying seaward of the ordinary low watermark for three nautical miles. In doing so, the court
stated, " . . the Federal Government rather than the state has paramount rights in and power
over that belt, and incident to which is full domination over the resources of the soil under
that water, including oil." (Emphasis added.) The decision thusly creates a new power in the
Federal Government, not one delegated from the people nor implied from a delegated power.
The term "paramount rights" is only a tautology of "sovereignty" and the effect of the decision
is to read sovereignty and omnipotent power into the Federal Government at the expense of
sovereignty in the people.
38 United States v. Butler, 279 U.S. 63, 66, 67, 68, 69, 77 (1936).
39 Id. at 65.
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er of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes
is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution."' 40 (Emphasis added.) The court further proceeds to reason that the adoption however of such a construction has some limitations, stating that (quoting Story) "the power to lay taxes for the common defense and general welfare of the United States is not in common sense a general power. It is limited
to those objects. It cannot constitutionally transcend them. '" 41
The conclusion of the court that the power to lay taxes for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States is not in common sense a general power is a false syllogism, because "the common defense and general welfare of the United States" is an all-conclusive and comprehensive term. The question of what is for the general welfare or a national purpose is purely a question of policy, the sole judge of which is Congress. And, the judiciary cannot constitutionally prescribe to the Legislative Department limitations upon the
exercise of what it now acknowledges to be an express power of Congress. The
responsibility for the exercise of the "general welfare," whether oppressive or
not, is not a question for the review of the courts, and the only constitutional
check on an abuse of congressional discretion is (a) the procedure set forth
in the Constitution and/or (b) the accountability of the legislators to the electors.
Madison argued that the adoption of the Story construction construing
Congress unlimited power to tax "for the common defense and general welfare" would be to nullify the entire doctrine of judicial review of the acts of
Congress on constitutional grounds, because such questions "relating to the general welfare being questions of policy and experience, are unsusceptible of ju42
dicial cognizance and decision."
40 Id. at 66.
41 Id. at 66. The fallacy of the court is the adoption of the Story construction despite the repe-

titious affirmations of limited powers. Nevertheless, this is the adoption of an unlimited power in Congress. Charles Warren has stated that the approval of Justice Story's construction "has
in fact resulted in vesting Congress with a power practically unlimited in its scope." CHARLES
WARREN, THE MAKING OF T-i CONSTITUTION, p. 447 (1938). It was but very few months
after the decision in United States v. Butler that this doctrine was enlarged in the case of Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), and in this case the court concludes that the discretion,
(speaking of the discretion of Congress to exercise the powers of the general welfare) however,
is not confined to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly
wrong a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment. Furthermore, the court concludes in this case ". . . nor is the concept of the general welfare static .... what is criti,
cal or urgent changes with the times." "Old age pensions and social benefits, therefore, fall
within the penumbra of 'solidarity interests' and are legitimate means to 'save men and women from the rigors of the poorhouse' as well as from the haunting fear that such a lot awaits
them when the journey's end is near." Both the doctrines in the Butler case and the Helvering
case in the adoption of the Story construction of the taxing power are in themselves a direct
repudiation of the doctrines of limited government. John Taylor, in discussing this type of
construction, concludes that this "is another instance in which unlimited power is attempted to
be inferred from a power acknowledged to be limited. Thus the wisdom of concession and the
ingenuity of retraction are so constantly blended, as finally to invest a government acknowledged
to be limited, with an unlimited power over the very restrictions imposed upon itself."
42 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, op. cit. supra note 26 at 569.
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Justice Stone in the dissenting opinion of the Butler case, in discussing the
right of the court to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, clearly advances
the proposition that "for the removal of unwise laws from the statute books
appeal lies not to the courts but to the ballot and to the processes of democratic government." Clearly this decision for all practical purposes destroys the
power of judicial review over congressional acts by vitiating the constitutional
limitations set forth in Article I, Sec. 8. Under such conclusions the maintenance and preservation of constitutional government must henceforth be placed
upon the discretion and good judgment of the members of Congress, and the
rights of the people are in turn relegated to their good judgment in exercising
their right of ballot.

